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SOCIAL EQUALITY AND THE HOUSING ALLOWANCE APPROACH
TO ASSISTIN THE POOR
Elizabeth Huttman and John Huttman
California State University, Hayward, and San
Francisco State University

Redistribution of income through direct grants of funds to the poor for
general use, such as welfare payments, is seen as the usual means for reducing
social equality. However, assistance in kind, such as Medi-Cal, school
lunches, and Food Stamps, also help to stretch the real income of the poor and
to bring their income closer to that of the rest of society. Another means of
achieving some degree of redistribution is through housing subsidies which
either provide the poor with a particular unit at low rent, such as public
housing, or give the poor funds specifically to use for housing, such as

through the experimental housing allowance.
In Europe these housing subsidies have been of major importance as a social equalizer mechanism increasing
working class incomes.
For example, almost a third of the British pay below
market rents in government-subsidized council housing, 40 per cent of Swedish
families with children receive a housing allowance, and well over a third of
Dutch families are in completely government-subsidized moderate rent housing
units.
This report discusses the role housing assistance has played in the
United States in decreasing social inequality of America's poor, and then, in
more detail, discusses the degree to which a housing allowance program, now
being experimented with, might do a better job of diminishing social inequality. The report is based on the author's ten years of research on subsidized
housing programs, especially public housing, new towns, housing for the elderly, and most recently, the HUD experymental housing allowance program and
European housing allowance programs.
Before discussing how the housing allowance might dminish social
inequality and the barriers that exist to it becoming a successful vehicle
for working towards this goal, it may be useful to examine the dimensions of
social inequality. Increasing social equality to many sociologists means
simply seeing that he lower strata in the society has a greater proportion
of the real income; in this context housing assistance is seen as being a
useful vehicle if it gives the poor monetary assistance or below market rents.
However, the definition or scope of social inequality can be seen to be
broader, referring to the inequality between the condition of the apartments
the poor live in compared to the housing that the rest of society lives in.
In the United States over a tenth of the households still live in substandard or over-crowded housing (and 25 per cent suffer from one or more
or three types of housing deprivation: over-crowding, substandardness, or an
unrealistic rent burden in relation to their income.)5 For example, half of
the 14 million welfare recipients live in substandard housing; 34 per cent
of all poor live in deteriorated housing. The relative deprivation the poor
feel because they are not in what they consider a "decent home" - the kind
of home shown daily on television and in the magazines - the negative psychological feeling they have from living in deteriorated housing, or even public

housing with its stigma, can be considered a ype of social inequality.
Sociologists, starting with Warner and Chapin have long considered residential dwelling as well as residential area a criteria for status and the poor
They feel they live in low status housing. High
share this judgment.
status or desirable residential units or areas may be deemed a scarce good
rewarded to the most esteemed members of society, as visualized in the DavidMoore theory. Different residential dwellings and areas can be een as
Inequality
indicators of power of different groups, as John Rex points out.
in residential condition and residential area can be a reminder or indicator
Conversely then, government assistance to make the
of general inequality.
units the poor live in more like those of the middle class or to make the
residential areas as desirable as the middle class or even upper working
class areas means diminishing the social inequality between these groups.
Even more effective could be government measures to facilitate the ability
of the poor to move into working class areas - in other words to facilitate
a class mix in neighborhoods that formerly had few poor residents. In
Britain this was a major goal for new towns; they were to be like a village
where the poor lived next to the middle class, as laborite leader Aneurin
Bevan demanded in authorizing legislation. British public housing Acouncil
housing) was to architecturally not look like housing for the poor.
In
Sweden, the idea given in policy statements for new towns was that the dustman should be able to live next door to the doctor. Mechanisms for class mix
or locational choice for the poor provide them with not only a more desirable
residential environment but in the U.S. a more desirable school for their
children as well as a wide ran@ of other more adequately staffed facilities,
from library to medical to recreational and park facilities.
It may also put
them in an area of better-paying and more accessible jobs, for many firms
have moved to outer fringe, suburban and certainly non-slum areas that are
often inaccessible by public transportation to slum dwellers.
In sum it is argued that greater social equality can mean other
things than greater equality in incomes; it can be in terms of housing of a
quality more equal to that of the rest of the society. In addition, greater
equality may be in terms of living in an improved neighborhood, reaching the
desired conditions of safety, cleanliness, service provision and even greenery
and a neighborhood inhabited by a mix of people including middle class. That
many of the poor strongly desire this type of equality can be illustrated by 9
the opinions of New York City welfare recipients who, when asked by Sternlieb
what they most wanted in housing, said a "good area"; their greatest dissatisfaction was that they lived in a bad area, an unsafe area, and an area of
drug use problems. The greatest general fear of these welfare recipients
was not over a job or their economic situation but concern over family and
self. Since many were female household heads on welfare or elderly one could
see why a safe area, a good neighborhood, were of more concern than a job.
Another fudy of elderly showed a very major interest was in modern comfortable
housing,
again showing that while equality in income is important, improved
housing and area are also of great concern.
To many housing is "not only
shelter" - "n? only a physical shell for people's lives" as Cans feels but
a major need.
Another type of social equality that is important when considering a
housing allowance is equality of treatment of groups at roughly the same

-158-

economic level, in this case the different categories of poor. A major
example of this is between the working poor who make up about 40 per cent
of all poor and seldom receive welfare payments, and the rest of the poor;
or between large and small families, poor families and elderly poor, white
and non-white poor, or between poor in different regions, or in urban and
rural areas, with the latter seldom receiving housing assistance (except for
minor Rural Housing programs).
Now let us briefly discuss the degree and the ways in which past (and
present) U.S. housing subsidies have served as a means of diminishing the
social inequality of the poor. However, before doing this we must remind
the readers that (1) the subsidized housing programs in the U.S. have had
other major goals, including increasing housing production, helping a
troubled housing industry and providing building industry jobs, housing
special groups such as war workers, renovating deteriorated inner areas and
brindng middle class families back into the city, and providing housing in
relation to regional growth schemes.
We must also point out that (2) the
major portion of financial assistance for housing in the United States has
gone not to the poor but to the middle class through home owner federal tax
deductions and through FHA-insured mortgages for mainly suburban housing.
Indirect subsidies in the amount of four to seven billion dollars have been
given to homeowners (mainly middle class) through Federal income tax deductioy
of mortgage interest, local property taxes and depreciation, Aaron estimates.
Second, over a fifth of the housing built from 1947 through the 19 6 0s was FHA
and VA-insured housing, again a subsidy to the middle and skilled working class.
To some degree one can add to this another subsidy, the cost of renovation of inner city areas, since in a number of cases, especially in the early
days, luxury or middle class FHA-Insured apartments were put on this cheap
urban renewal land, while many low rent housing units were torn down.
Even
rehabilitation funds have often benefited those of higher ecnnomic status
than the poor because rents were raised after rehabilitation and thus the
poor were forced out.
Regarding housing assistance specifieally directed to the poor, the
conventional public housing program started in 1937 is one of the oldest and
largest. Yet only about one million families, mostly at every low economic
level, out of 16 million poor households, are honed in these specially
designed units that rent at below market prices,
adjusted to the family's
income.
In ofer
words, less than four per cent of the poor are helped by
this program.
Second, many of these projects, sited in slum areas and
containing a large concentration of poor ftgilies (up to 10-13,000 families),
are considered undesirable by their users.
Users often do not feel it is
home and in fact they are usually forced to leave after their income reaches
a maximum that is increasingly far below median U.S. incomes.
As users they
are stigmatized by outsiders; as residents they suffer from exposure to a
variety of deviant acts, including violence, vandalism, drug use, mainly by
the large teenage groups found in these large family projects.
While projects in small towns often have a more congenial atmosphere
and while in some cities use of scattered sites wit4 7 a small number of turnkey units per site, such as in Oakland, California,
has decreased these
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problems, many experts feel the $30,000 or more cost per unit, the high operating costs, and the difficulty of locating acceptable sites means one can not
They feel the results do not
justify the expenditure on this type of program.
produce a great enough improvement in environment even though the unit is a
great enough improvement in its standardness and modernness, and may include
Provision of a
facilities and services not found in conventional housing.
physical building rather than financial assistance to the person they feel
may not be the best course and certainly not the cheapest.
Since the 1973
public housing has been built and operating costs, especially
moratorium little
with the Brooke amendment that assured families paid no more than 25 per cent
of their income for rent, have gone up and caused hardships on many public
housing authorities.
Starting with the Johnson administration new programs, including
Section 235 and 236, have been introduced that utilized the private market
to a much greater degree, using private suppliers of housing while still
emphasizing provision of specifically designed units. By the January 1973
moratorium on these 236 and 235 programs they had provided almost half as
many dwellings in this short period as public housing had in 35 years.
Section 235 was a home purchase program, with interest rate subsidy, for
moderate income.
It was halted due to realtor practices in migy cities of
patching up old houses and selling them to unsuspecting poor.
The Section 236 housing program has non-profit or limited profit
sponsors who are assisted by below market interest rates; however, 236 users
could also get a rent supplement to make up for the difference between the
rent and 25 per cent of their income.
Less than a fourth of the users utilized
the rent supplement and most users were near the top category of the maximum
income allowed for this moderate income program (median income of users was
$5,500). The hope that buildingf would be sited in non-slum areas was unfulfilled in the majority of cases,
and lack of sufficient financial reserves
or management fiscal skills caused many developments to run into serious
financial troubles when rent delinquencies occurred.
Second, one-fourth of
every subsidy dollar in the program weM to financiers and misuse occurred,
even wholesale thievery, as Gans says.
Leased public housing (Section 23) has represented a change in course
that brought the U.S. type assistance closer to a housing allowance type
approach as it utilizes existing housing. The subsidy is in terms of the
difference between the rent and a percentage of income of the tenant, with
various deductions. Unlike the convential public housing assistance is mainly
in terms of giving help to the person rather than the building. The Section
23 program differs from a standard housing allowance because the public housing
authority in most cases locates the unit, negotiates the lease, pays the rent
and subleases the unit to the chosen public housing tenant who pays the housing
authority a specified percentage of his income toward the unit's rent.
In
some areas of the country, notably the West, this has been a popular program
with housing authorities; some authorities have only had a leased program.
The program's problems have stemmed from lack of enough funding to meet administrative costs and a lack of standard units at rents low enough to meet
program requirements.
Thus it has been forced to send applicants out to look
for their own units ("finders-keepers" hunt).
According to a 1972 HUD audit

report, in some authorities prelease inspections were not made, allowing
tenants to move into substandard uts and rents were paid to landlords in
excess of prevailing market rents.
Defenders of the program point out that
the agency helps the powerless poor by bargaining and negotiating a lease
with landlords, paying and guaranteeing the rent, and in most cases locating
the unit for them. Section 23 is now being superceded by Section 8 of the
1974 Housing Act which will have the applicant personally dealing with the
landlord.
Other minor housing programs for specific groups include the Section
202 elderly housing program of direct low interest loans for non-profit and
limited dividend housing - 45,000 units through 1971 - which serves mainly
those slightly above the poverty level.
The biggest housing subsidy to the poor has actually come as part of
welfare assistance. Over 14 million persons receive welfare; most use over
25 per cent of their check for housing. Yet even then the money is usually
not enough to cover the market rent in decent housing in non-slum areas.
Second, discrimination against welfare recipients, non-whites, and female
heads means they must often pay above market rents. Half have been found to
live in substandard housing. In New York City they were found to be increasingly concentrated in certain slum area apartment houses, usually where the
landlord did a minimum of repairs and provldj poor service. Almost half of
these recipients in one New York City survey
were dissatisfied with their
housing, and especially with the area it was in, though many were satisfied
with apartment size, apartment amenities and even maintenance. Most were in
pre-1929 housing.
Thus in concluding this section on the degree that past and present
housing assistance programs have helped diminish social inequality between
the poor and other groups, one must say that in a number of cases the programs
have not provided a decent non-slum area, although in some areas and a number
of cases they have. In some instances the unit has not been standard housing
meeting the very minimum qualification for standardness; in other cases while
the unit has been standard, such as conventional public housing or Section
236, use has stigmatized the recipient. In some programs so little money has
been provided that either the recipient can not find a standard unit or the
program is in serious financial difficulties. In some cases, the moderate
income and not the poor have been served; in fact the various assistance
programs themselves have increased social inequality in one way as they have
graded the poor into different strata of recipients with the very poor in
public housing and slightly better off in Sec. 236. The programs have produced other types of gradation, with the "cream" of the poor, the more
deserving poor, especially the elderly, more likely accepted in Section 23
private units (now Section 8) or 236 units.
Last, while the present programs with all the above problems for a
number of users, have provided decent housing, and some type of income assistance, and allowed some to move to decent neighborhoods (especially whites in
small towns and white elderly in general), the programs in toto have given
assistance to only a small portion of the poor. As Heinberg points out
"current federal programs to subsidize rental housing are meeting only a very

small part of the need of low income for assistance as we have defined it;
only about four per cent of the recipient units 25stimated to be eligible for
a housing allowance were being helped in 1969."
Yet 41 these programs are
estimated to cost a number of billion dollars annually.
The question is can a housing allowance do a better job in meeting the
desired goals of providing a degree of social equality in terms of added
income for housing for the poor and improved housing units, as well as a more
desirable neighborhood - for more poor and at less cost per household helped?
And we must unfortunately add, is there less likelihood this program will be
defeated through adverse actions by landlords, market intermediaries and administrators than pas 5 programs; can their negative actions be minimized, controlled or prevented?
A housing allowance pays the family the difference between the cost of
private housing and a percentage of their income, the "housing gap" formula,
or by a second formula, the applicant pays a pgcentage of rent and the
housing allowance covers the rest of the rent,
if they move to or live in
a standard unit or stay in standard units. The applicant, possibly armed
with a certificate showing the landlord he is on the program, hunts for the
unit and then negotiates the lease and other terms of the arrangement. He
has consumer freedom of choice in hunting out a unit and the chance of moving,
carrying the subsidy with him, for the subsidy goes to the person not the
building. Existing units are utilized. The housing allowance amount fluctuates as family income changes but can be available up to a moderate income
(this Urban Institute original design 2 et the breakoff amount at around
$6,700 for a family of four in 1969).
Thus, a housing allowance falls in
the general class of income support program, but one that falls into the
category of an in-kind assistance as the recipient must use his grant, a house
allowance, specifically for one good housing, and that it must be standard
housing.
An experimental housing allowance is now being funded by HUD in 12
medium size American jurisdictions and effects 20,000 or so households; two
are "Demand" experiments designed to give indications of the use pattern,
eight are "Administrative" experiments to indicate which types of agencies or
bureaucracies best run the program, and two are "Supply" experinents to try
to evaluate the effect on the market of running a housing allowance program.
The Demand and the Administrative experiments are now several years old but
the important Rand-run Supply experiment has just gotten underway.
The potential advantages in a housing allowance indiminishing social
inequality. A major advantage of a housing allowance would be it could help
more people at a lower cost. Today the subsidy programs cost billions and
only helps four per cent of the poor. The Urban Institute, using 1969-70
data calculates the housing, allowance would cost seven billion dollars for
the 16.6 million households they consider eligible (10.9 million families and
5.7 million single individuals, mainly elderly) with families up to incomes

of $6,755 receiving some allowance (decreasing as income rises) and 20 per
cent of their income required as contribution to rent (if 25 per cent then
families up to $5,420). The average payment was assumed to he around $462.
Administrative costs for a mass check-giving program have been assumed to be
lower than present housing programs.
This all must be compared with the
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$30,000 or more cost of new public housing units and their operating expenses.
If urban and rural differences in rents were included in the housing allowance
formula or the roughly 30 per cent who were homeowners had a proportion of
equity in their home deducted or were not included in the program, or if singles
were excluded, the cost could be reduced.
The lower cost of the housing allowance versus other programs is assuming there are no subsidized building programs and most writers, including ourselves, feel the supply of housing must be increased if housing allowance
program is to succeed. However, if as we feel and Gans 3 and others suggest,
the supply increase in terms of a subsidy program for middle class housing,
with reliance on the filter-down process to meet the housing needs of low
income families, then funds fo 1 it could come from a change in the federal
tax deductions for homeowners,
bringing in four to seven billion dollars,
as Gans has suggested. We would also have to correct the defects of the
filter-down process.
Since welfare recipients would have the housing allowance as a substitute
for the part of their welfare check they usually use rent (hopefully it would
not be a complete deduction from these already low welfare payments) some of
the funds - at least for 14 million persons - are simply substitutes that
formerly were paid by a different branch of government. The difference would
be that with the housing allowance one would be required to live in a standard
unit or hopefully there would be more assistance on lease negotiation and
general tenant landlord relations.
The housing allowance would, of course, also benefit many who are
neither on welfare or do not require a full welfare grant but can get along
with some minor assistance, just as in the case of Food Stamps program.
Second, it would benefit those not interested in applying for the traditional
stigmatized public housing or even Section 236. Application to the program
would presumably be simple and be quickly processed, thus encouraging participation. One could stay on the program as one's income rose thus helping
moderate income as well. The housing allowance would also benefit the poor
in many parts of the country that are now not served by a public housing
authority. The Urban Institute estimates almost 30 per cent of the households
eligible to receive the allowance would be rural; 42 per cent would be outside
SMSA areas; and another 21 per cent would be in suburban areas within SMSAs;
40 per cent of the households receive an allowance would b52 in the South; only
21 per cent of the eligible recipients would be non-whites.
Thus it would
be a program possibly covering the following groups more than programs: the
rural poor, the working poor, and even the elderly poor, and regionally, the
Southern poor, though both of the latter groups are highly represented in
present programs. Thus the allowance would diminish inequality income wise.
Another major attribute of the housing allowance is that to receive the
housing allowance, users will not have to live in large, often-stigmatized
public housing projects with a dominance of children in slum areas and often
crime-ridden areas, or in Section 236 housing which is also sometimes stigmatized, again usually located in inner city areas. They will be using their
allowance for private housing and thus be indistinguishable from other renters.
They can even change units and take the housing allowance with them, thus
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having the consumer freedom of private renters.

Second, they can find housing

outside slum areas so will benefit from an improved neighborhood and from

class mix in the ways given above. In the early small OEO housing allowance
conducted in Kansas City5 where all participants had been in substandard
housing Art Solomon reports these participants moved out of the deteriorated
slum area in which they lived at the outset of the experiment to newer neighborhoods of higher socio-economic status, in terms of median family income,
education level and head of household occupation; 58 per cent of the families
moved completely out of 1970 Census-defined poverty areas. These families
moved to areas with more owner-occupied units and lower density and crime
rates, and often themselves moved into single family dwellings. These families usually moved to older residential areas on the fringe of the city rather
than suburban areas. Minorities usually stayed within racially segregated or
mixed areas. Early indications from the HUD experiments show that, at least
for the elderly, those that did move after they applied for the housing allowance, usually to obtain a standard unit to qualify, changed neighborhoods in
many cases, got larger units and were more satisfied with their housing.
Recipients of leased public housing assistance, which has many of the
characteristics of a housing allowance, have also in many cities such as San
Francisco3rnd Oakland been found to be dispersed over a number of areas of
the city;
of course this has been more true of elderly recipients. Second,
if the housing recipients are the temporary poor, such as students and young
married, their dispersal among a higher income group may be especially likely,
as it is in Holland, Sweden, and other countties where the young are among the
recipients, because they can only find expensive new units, in a housing
shortage situation, at the same time that their incomes are still quite low.
In the case where users do stay in slum areas the housing allowance
might be an incentive for the landlord to repair and renovate, as well as
maintain his building. The landlord, of course, must provide a standard
unit, and he has more reason to. He has a guarantee of continual flow of
rental funds, backed by a lease and government agency rent funding, and even
by a security deposit. Under a large program the landlord will be surrounded
by landlords having the same guarantees and same incentive to improve, and thus
he would feel his investment is more worthwhile as the area is being upgraded.
In fact, rehabilitation funds are likely to go to landlords taking housing
allowance recipients. Optimistically, the lotal result could be less red-lining
or under-investment in central city areas and improvement now of such areas
and more provision of municipal services.
35
Against these advantages, several opponents of the house allowance
have pessimistically pointed out why in the market-oriented American housing
situation the program is likely to fail. Their most powerful arguments are
that 1) there is not a large enough supply of low rent housing to provide
standard units for those who might, under a housing allowance, seek standard
units in non-slum area, thus only the "cream of the recipients" will get the
available standard low rent units. 2) Furthermore, scarcity of such housing
will mean the landlord can up the rents and thus the housing allowance will go
to the landlord rather than the recipient. 3) "Standardness" criteria will be
ignored in many cities and thus recipients will still be in slum units as
welfare recipients now are and not have their housing status improved. 4) The
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funds allocated by the Administration will not be enough to cover the many
needy applicants or the allowance per recipient will be too small to allow
the recipient to rent decent standard units (as true with U.S. welfare payments and with the housing allowance in Sweden, Holland and a few other
countries). 5) Barriers of discrimination will still mean certain poor will
continue to get the least desirable housing; this includes discrimination
against welfare recipients, female household heads or minorities. 6) If the
public housing authority had trouble locating qualified units at cheap rents,
negotiating leases with landlords, tenants on their own will have more trouble.
7) the unscrupulous practices landlords, real estate personnel and developers
have used in the past in their participation in HUD programs, whether 235,
236 or Section 23, may defeat this program too, mainly by upping rents and not
doing required repairs to make units standard. In conclusion, these critics
feel the poor will only continue to get slum dwellings at higher rents.
One can not simply deny these charges. On the other hand one should
not throw out a potentially useful program for reaching a greater degree of
social equality for more poor without seeing whether these obstacles can not
be removed. Regarding the supply problem, there is no question that a subsidized building program or assistance on interest rates for housing, or help to
saving and loan associations or some other measure to increase building is
needed. We already have evidence that in cities where the vacancy rate is
very low many potential housing allowance users ended up dropping out of the
HUD experiment program because they could not find standard units, as was also
true in the Wilmington Model Cities housing allowance experiment. With 16
million households possibly eligible, this means a large group hunting for
standard Units, both in urban and rural areas; where there is a vacancy rate
of 1-2 per cent (and many vacant units being either not standard units or
being luxury units) the poor, especially various minority categories, can not
compete. Gans has suggested we help alleviate the problem by subsidizing
middle class units, especially in the suburbs and also end federal income tax
deductions to property owners; we agree but feel that housing should be in new
towns, a more planned environment, and in inner city areas rather than the
suburbs and the obstacles to the filter-down process corrected. Hartman suggests we keep building public housing but we disagree, feeling the cost and the
negative feeling towards housing projects do not warrant it and, second,
wonder if the poor rather than a slightly higher income group should get new
housing if the program is not to suffer from alienating these other income
groups. In other words, should we give a greater degree of social equality
(a new house) to a few poor, followed by opposition of the higher income to a
housing assistance program; a house allowance, utilizing existing housing,
might cause less opposition, and give more help to more people in the end.
Besides increasing supply, another complimentary policy to the housing
allowance program would be a rehabilitation program; with the "carrot" of a
rehabilitation grant or loan the landlord may be encouraged to bring up to
standard his units and rent them to housing allowance recipients. This and
other ways, such as staff of sufficient size for inspection and code enforcement, must be used to assure the units are standard or the program is little
better than a welfare check program. The program may also have to be accompanied by grants for financial assistance to improve the area. The housing
allowance administrative agencies may also have to decide certain areas of the
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city are unsuitable and not approve use of housing in these areas, as occurs
with some Section 23 programs.
Another measure that must accompany any nation-wide housing allowance
program is some sort of rent regulation. While rent control has failed, discouraging investment in rental units due to limited profit return, some sort
of "fair rents" must be determined, changing as the costs rise and allowing a
realistic profit to the investor but not exorbitant rent 5gcreases due to
introduction of a housing allowance. New York City's MBR (maximum base rent)
program, introduced for former rent controlled housing, might be a guide but
inspection to see the landlord offers full services and does repairs would need
to be better than New York City. In addition, agency personnel would be
needed to monitor the degree landlords participating in the program discriminate. This personnel would also have to help negotiate eases and back-up
tenant demands for repairs and even help locate units.3
The program to succeed would also have to give large enough allowances
to realistically relate to market rents at that time so that the recipient can
locate a standard unit within the program specified rent scale. The program
also should not require the recipient to use over 25, or even 20, per cent of
his income for rent, sinceeven 75 per cent of a low income, say $4,000, is
hardly enough to cover non-shelter needs in this inflationary period. We feel
strongly that the elderly single with his or her limited resources and high
medical and drug costs should not be made to pay o3r 25 per cent of their
small income for rents (many now pay 35 per cent).
In conclusion, we feel these complimentary programs and regulations,
especially measures to increase the supply of housing are needed if the
program is to succeed. With a fear that these requirements will not be fully
met in large cities, one can predict the housing allowance will best help
those in medium to small size cities, towns with a high vacancy rate, towns
with considerable standard housing, suburban communities with an increasing
number of moderate income housing units and no public housing, and rural areas
where suitable reasonable units have been so seriously lacking that many have
turned to mobile homes, and special groups such as the elderly, the temporary
poor (students). For them in particular a housing allowance program can bring
a greater degree of social equality than has occurred from past programs,
especially as it can help a greater number of them.
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